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A MINOR OF 'SUFFICIENT AGE AND
UNDERSTANDING' SHOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO PETITION
FOR THE TERMINATION OF THE PARENTAL RELATIONSHIP
On the windowless facade of the New York County courthouse in
Manhattan a frieze is carved, symbolizing family law. The artist' sculpted
the following three figures on this wall. Justice, depicted as a robed
woman, is sitting-without a blindfold-and holding the scales of justice
in one of her hands. The other hand reaches down to the two other
figures in the sculpture: a child looking up and a snake writhing alongside
the child.
The depiction is ambiguous. Is Justice reaching for the snake or the
child? Is she going to pick up the child to protect it from the snake-or
is she going to pick up the snake along with the child? Symbolically, this
sculpture presents the problems of children in family law. How can the
justice system best address the problems facing today's children without
making the situation worse for both the system and the child?2 Is it
possible to stop the snake from biting either the child or Justice, or both?
Justice Bracewell, an English judge who was much involved with the
1989 revision of United Kingdom law relating to children,3 notes that
family law is unusual in the framework of jurisprudence. 4 Instead of
making findings only with regard to past events, family law is unique in
that it must assess and plan for the future.5 Family law must redress past
wrongs by anticipating with whom a child will best develop. 6 According
to Justice Bracewell, in the United Kingdom the ability of family law to
deal with this unique problem was "straitjacketed" by laws passed years
1. The artist is unknown.
2. Much has been written about the rights of children within the legal system. See
generally DAVID ARCHARD, CHILDREN: RIGHTS AND CHILDHOOD (1993); LAURENCE
HOULGATE, FAMILY AND STATE: THE PHILOSOPHY OF FAMILY LAw (1988); Wendy A.

Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference and Mystery: Children'sPerspectivesand the Law, 36
ARiz. L. REv. 11 (1994); Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert
Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1860 (1987); Barbara B. Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A ChildCentered Perspective on Parents' Rights, 14 CARDoZO L. REV. 1747 (1993); Barbara
B. Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?": Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property,

33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995 (1992).
3. See discussion infra part V.
4. See The HonorableJustice Bracewell, Q.C., Lecture on the Practical Implications
of The Children Act 1989 in Comparative Family Law 1-2, at the Notre Dame London
Law Centre (July 11, 1994) (transcript on file with New York Law SchoolLaw Review)

[hereinafter Justice Bracewell].
5. Id.
6. Id.
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ago which were ill-adapted to the needs of children in a rapidly changing
society.7

What changes have precipitated this need for a revamping of family
law? As early as 1930, the writer Aldous Huxley described the forces he
thought were rending the family.'

On the one hand, Huxley thought,

individualism, and, on the other, humanitarianism, have changed the way
society

thinks

of children

and our responsibilities

for

them. 9

Humanitarianism has made us, as a society, believe that "children have

rights and that we are not justified in imposing on them too strict a

discipline or constraint.""0

Individualism has made "parents feel that

they too have rights .... They want to 'live their own lives,' [and] 'to
express themselves'.... In a word, they resent the weight of family
responsibilities."" Huxley concludes by stating that against this double

assault the family cannot stand.' 2

Perhaps the failure of the law to

recognize how our ideals of individualism and humanitarianism have
7. Id.
8. Aldous Huxley, Babies-StateProperty,EVENING STANDARD, May 21, 1930, at
7, reprintedin THE HIDDEN HUXLEY 47-59 (David Bradshaw ed., 1994).

9. Id. at 47.
10. Id.
11. Id.at 48.
12. Id.at 50. Huxley, of course, went on to write Brave New World, in which the
word, "parent" was a dirty word and "everybody belonged to everybody else." ALDOUS
HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD 66-78 (Perennial Library 1969) (1932). Neil Postman,
a professor of Linguistics and Communications, believes that our world is becoming
distinctly more "Huxleyian." See NEIL POSTMAN, AMUSING OURSELVES TO DEATH 155-

63 (1985).
Note also New York City's reaction to the death of Eliza Izquierdo in November,
1995 at the hands of her abusive mother. See Lizette Alvarez, With Anger and Shame,
a Child is Buried, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1995, at B1. Although the press reports
condemn the mother's actions, the real blame for Eliza's death seemed to be placed on
the New York Child Welfare Agency's inaction. Joe Sexton, Officials Fault City's
Inaction In An Abuse Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1996, at BI; see also Raymond
Hernandez, State is Ruled Accountable Over Calls on Child Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
2, 1996, § 1, at 22; Kate S. Lombardi, Child Abuse System Faulted, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
7, 1996, § 13, at I (Westchester Edition). Reaction to her abuse and death was so
intense that New York Governor George Pataki sought and the New York legislature
passed a law (signed by Pataki) allowing prosecutors access to records involving children
who had been abused and were under the state's or a city's protective care. See
Raymond Hernandez, Albany Set to Relax Secrecy in Instances of Child Abuse, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 1, 1996, at Al; Raymond Hernandez, Law to Ease Disclosures on Child
Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1996, at B5; Joe Sexton, Agency's Head Assails Abuse
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1996, § 1, at 26. For further proposed changes to the New
York child welfare laws, see infra notes 231-41 and accompanying text.
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changed the family has, as Justice Bracewell states,
"straitjacketed" the
3
courts into ineffectively dealing with children.'
The purpose of this Note, however, is not to discuss the philosophical
underpinnings of the family or even the ability of family law to anticipate
and plan for future events in a child's life. Instead, this Note explores the
more narrow issue of whether a child, in his or her own capacity, should
be able to petition to terminate the parental relationship. The changing
structure of the family and the ability of the courts to predict what will be
best for a child, though, lurks behind all issues involving children and
their rights in our society and in our system of justice.14
The position of this Note is that a minor child, as defined by each
state,"5 should be able to sue on her or his own behalf for termination of
parental rights, provided she or he is of sufficient age and understanding
as determined by the court." This position finds support from several
sources: first, in one Arizona case, Appeal in Pima County Juvenile
Severance Action No. S-113432, 7 and in various state statutes" and
their possible interpretations by the courts; second, in other areas of the
law where children's traditional legal disabilities have been abrogated;
third, in the sheer amount of child abuse and neglect cases and the long
delays and inefficiencies perpetuated by state social service agencies; and
fourth, in the recognition of a child's right to petition in the United
Kingdom under The Children Act of 1989.19 In fact, The Children Act
takes this same position-minors determined by the courts to be of
"sufficient age and understanding" are allowed to petition on their own
behalf.'
The first part of this Note examines the common law rights of
children and their constitutional rights as recognized by the United States
Supreme Court. The second part discusses the removal of some of the
traditional legal disabilities of children in areas of the law where they may
13. See Justice Bracewell, supra note 4, at 1.
14. See ARCHARD, supra note 2, at 1-25 (analyzing children's rights from a
historical perspective); Minow, supra note 2, at 1903-28 (discussing the defenders and
critics of "rights" in American society and the role that rights play in family law

matters).
15. The usual age of majority is 18. See, e.g., CoNN.

GEN. STAT.

ANN. § 46b-150

(West 1994).
16. See discussions infra parts IV, V.
17. 872 P.2d 1240 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993)
18. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-533(A) (1994) (allowing "any person.

with a legitimate interest" to sue for termination of parental rights).
19. See The Children Act (1989) (Eng.); discussion infra part V.
20. The Children Act § 10(2)(b).
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petition a court directly. The process of termination of parental rights and
an analysis of the case law and statutes involved comprises the third part.
The fourth part recounts the current position of children in our society, the
statistics on child abuse, and the ability of state agencies to deal with the
problem. The fifth part analyzes The Children Act of 1989 in the United
Kingdom with regard to the rights of children. The Note concludes with
the proposition that a court should make a determination whether a child
has sufficient age and understanding to bring a termination of parental
rights suit, and upon such a finding allow a child to petition directly in his
or her own name.
I.

COMMON LAW BACKGROUND AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

Traditionally, minor children have been under legal disabilities that
In most
flow from their dependent position on their parents. 2'
jurisdictions such legal disabilities of children include the inability to
establish their own domicile,' retain their own earnings,' enter into
binding contracts, 24 consent to their own medical, surgical, dental, or
psychiatric care without parents' consent,2 sue or be sued in their own
name,2 sue their parents for injuries caused them by their parents,27
make a will, hire or be an agent, 29 enter into a partnership,30 and
21. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES & SCIENTIFIC ANALYSIS CORP.,
THE LEGAL STATUS OF ADOLESCENTS 11 (1981) [hereinafter THE LEGAL STATUS OF
ADOLESCENTS]. See generally WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS
OF ENGLAND *446-75.

22. See THE LEGAL STATUS OF ADOLESCENTS, supra note 21, at 11 (listing and
discussing the traditional legal disabilities of children). See generally LAURENCE
HOULGATE, THE CHILD AND THE STATE: A NORMATIvE THEORY OF JUVENILE RIGHTS

(1980) (discussing the philosophical and ethical norms that flow from a recognition of
children's rights); ROBERT MNOOKIN, CHILD, FAMILY AND STATE 20-45 (1978)

(examining federal and state cases which set the boundaries of authority between
children, parents, and state); I. SLOAN, YOUTH AND THE LAw (1981) (giving an
overview of children's procedural and substantive rights); Youth Law Center, Legal
Rights of Children in the United States, 13 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 675, 677-78
(1981-82) (discussing the trend toward greater recognition of children's rights).
23. See THE LEGAL STATUS OF ADOLESCENTS, supra note 21, at 11.

24.
25.
26.
27.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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convey real property.31 This comprehensive list of legal disabilities
comports with the importance historically attached to family privacy in
America. 2
Over the last fifty years, the courts and legislatures in many
jurisdictions have relaxed, at least in part, some of the traditional legal
disabilities of childhood.33 Other areas of law, like tax and criminal law,
have recognized that children under the age of eighteen should sometimes
be treated as adults. The reasoning behind the removal of these legal
disabilities is a sometimes tacit, sometimes explicit, recognition that
children have substantive rights under the Constitution;34 thus, procedural
rights in court are necessary to vindicate substantive rights.35 This slow
erosion of the barriers to the procedural capacity of children in other
areas36 of the law bolsters the decision to allow a child to sue on his or
her own behalf for the termination of parental rights. The same reasoning
for abridging traditional legal disabilities in other contexts is applicable to
the decision of whether to allow a child to sue for termination of parental
rights.
The common law concept of parenspatriaegives courts the power to
control matters of the family,37 and, in general, gives the states the
prerogative to control its citizens.3" The source of the parens patriae
authority remains unclear.39 Historically, parenspatriae originated from
English common law, where the king had the royal prerogative to act as
guardian to persons, such as lunatics, who had legal disabilities.' The
fact that the parens patiae power, however, was ever applied to infants
seems to be a historical accident. 4 Lord Coke's report of Beverley's
31. Id.
32. MICHAEL DALE, REPRESENTING THE CHILD CLIENT, § 3.01 (1991 & Supp.
Aug. 1994).
33. See discussion infra part II.
34. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 53, 74 (1976) (stating that
"[m]inors as well as adults ... possess constitutional rights.").
35. See DALE, supra note 32, § 3.02.
36. See discussion infra part II.
37. Parens patriae literally means "parent of the country." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990).
38. JOSEPH M. HAWES, THE CHILDREN'S RIGHTS MOVEMENT 1-15 (1991)
(discussing the concept of parens patriae and the role of the state in children's rights
from 1640 to 1800 in America).
39. Id.

40. See Lawrence B. Custer, The Origins of the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 27
EMORY L.J. 195, 196-97 (1978).
41. Id. at 202-03.
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Case4' in 1610 accidentally replaced the word "idiot" with "infant," and
in 1658, the translation of the 1610 edition from French duplicated the
error and exchanged yet another word "idiot" for "infant. 43 Subsequent
cases then cited Beverley's Case to support the government's parens
patriaepower over infants.'
The unsure foundation of the doctrine in England did not become firm
in crossing the Atlantic to this country. A sampling of United States

Supreme Court decisions from this century shows the apparent
contradictions in the strength of the parens patriae power. In the 1925

decision of Pierce v. Society of Sisters' the Court held: "The child is not
the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct his
destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and
prepare him for additional obligations."'
In Pierce, the Court
invalidated an Oregon statue which required children to attend only public
school.47 Finding a substantive due process right in the liberty of parents

and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under
their control, the Court allowed the children to attend private school,
instead of public school.'
42. 4 Coke's Rep. 126b (London 1658).
43. Id. at 203. A phrase which originally read, "That if an idiot. . . " now read,
"That if an infant who cannot defend, govern, or order his lands, tenements, goods, or
chattels, the King of right ought to have him in his custody, and to protect him ......
Id. (quoting Beverley's Case, 4 Coke's Rep. at 126b). Beverley's Case was not a
chancery court case, but was decided by the King's Bench. Id. at 205.
44. See id. at 204-05 (giving Shaftsbury v. Shaftsbury, 25 Eng. Rep. 121, 122 (Ch.
1725) as an example of such a case).
45. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
46. Id. at 535.
47. Id.
48. Id.; see also Ex Parte Livingston, 135 N.Y.S. 328 (App. Div. 1912) (holding
that the child could not be placed in or adopted in another home where the natural
mother was able to care for the child). The Livingston Court was skeptical of the parens
patriaepower:
This phrase [parens patriae] is very illusory in its meaning and has meant
different things at different times in world history. .

.

. It has been used

frequently to justify the acts of absolute power when the ruler and the legal
state were one and the same ....

But under our political system the state is

not "omnipotent," and if it be "parenspatriae," it is only so in a very
restricted sense, and with due restraint as to the rights of individuals resting
upon natural justice, and surrounded by the bulwarks of constitutional
safeguards.
Id. at 331-28.

19961

NOTE: TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RELATIONSHIP

Nineteen years later, however, in Prince v. Massachusetts the

Supreme Court bolstered the parens patriae power of the states,4 9

holding that a state's authority over the conduct of children exceeds its
authority to control the conduct of adults.'

"[N]either rights of religion

nor rights of parenthood are beyond limitation.

Acting to guard the

general interest in youth's well being, the state as parens patriae may

restrict the parent's control by requiring school attendance, regulating or
prohibiting the child's labor, and in many other ways. "' As a result, the

state was able to prohibit the sale of obscene materials to minors
regardless of whether those same materials would be considered obscene
to adults.5 2
With economic substantive due process of the Lochner era
discredited 3 and thus, unavailable to check the growing expansion of the
government, the Supreme Court in In re Gaulte again examined the

concept of parens patriae:
The Latin phrase [parens patriae] proved to be a great help to
those who sought to rationalize the exclusion of juveniles form

the constitutional scheme; but its meaning is murky and its
historic credentials are of dubious relevance. The phrase was
taken from chancery practice, where, however, it was used to
describe the power of the state to act in loco parentis [in the place
49. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 166.
52. Id.
53. The shift away from striking down statutes on substantive due process grounds
started in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). I do not mean to imply
that all pre-1937 substantive due process cases have been relegated to the history books.
Pierceand Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), remain viable modem precedents.
See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499-506 (1977) (relying on Pierce and
Meyer to strike down a law that forbade members of one's family, outside of the
immediate family, from living together). The Court explained that "Meyer and Pierce
have enjoyed frequent reaffirmance while other substantive due process cases of the same
era have been repudiated." Id. at 501 n.8.
The Court's reasoning in Princewas reaffirmed in 1982. See New York v. Ferber,
458 U.S. 747 (1982) (upholding a New York statute that prohibited distribution of
material depicting a sexual performance by a child under the age of sixteen regardless
of whether or not the material is obscene). The Court did not make specific mention of
the parenspatriae power, however.
54. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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of the parent] for the purposes of protecting the property interests
and the person of the child.'
In re Gault seems to cast a pall of suspicion over the doctrine of parens
patriae. Instead of allowing the state to be the "parent" of the child, the
Court began to recognize that children are human beings with
constitutional rights separate from their parents.5 6 This recognition
began in In re Gault,5 7 where the Supreme Court held that children in
juvenile proceedings are entitled to many of the same constitutional
procedural rights as adults. 8 Yet, while minors under the threat of
criminal penalties may be entitled to some procedural rights under a
constitutional analysis, the question of their substantive constitutional
rights is problematic.
The source of this problem is that giving children constitutional rights
has a tendency to displace the authority and constitutional rights of
parents. The Supreme Court has held, for example, that "[tihere is a
presumption, strong but rebuttable, that parents are the appropriate
decision maker for their infants." 59 While the state has the authority in
some areas of law to circumscribe parental authority, the issue of exactly
what rights children have under the Constitution remains unclear. On one
hand, the Supreme Court stated: "Constitutional rights do not mature and
come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of
majority. Minors, as well as adults . . . possess constitutional rights."'
On the other hand, in Santosky v. Kramer," the Supreme Court
recognized that parents have a liberty interest in the parent-child
relationship. 2
In Santosky, the Court dealt with the issue of what burden of proof
must be employed to substantiate a showing of parental unfitness to
terminate parental rights.63 In order to protect a parent's liberty interest
in parenthood, due process requires a showing of the basis for terminating
55. Id. at 16.
56. See DALE, supra note 32, § 3.01.
57. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
58. Id. But see McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (holding that
minor has no right to jury trial in juvenile delinquency proceedings).
59. Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610, 627 n.13 (1986) (plurality
opinion).
60. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
61. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
62. Id. at 753.
63. Id. at 747-48.
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parental rights by clear and convincing evidence.' 4 The Santosky Court

also recognized that children have liberty interests that require
protection,' however, the liberty interests are secondary to first
establishing parental unfitness.66
In several areas of law, however, a state's authority trumps parental

authority: child labor,67 access to pornography,68 marriage of infants,69

and physical and emotional deprivation or violence.7" But the decision
whether to commit a child to a state mental institution is largely left to the
parents. 7'

The areas of education and abortion are much more muddled. In the
field of education, the Supreme Court has held that the state can require

children below a certain age to attend some school,' however, as we
have seen, the school need not be a public school. 73 States cannot
prohibit teaching of foreign languages.74 Yet, when schooling interferes
with the parents' religious beliefs, mandatory schooling cannot be
required.7' With regard to abortion, the state has assumed the role of
7 the Supreme Court
alternative parent.76
In Bellotti v. Baird,7

invalidated a Massachusetts law requiring parental consent for abortions
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id.
Id. at 754 n.7.
See id.
See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
68. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639-43 (1968).
69. See People v. Benu, 385 N.Y.S.2d 222 (Crim. Ct. 1976).
70. See People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); Padgett v.
Department of Health and Rehabilitative Serv., 577 So. 2d 565, 570 (Fla. 1991).
71. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602-03 (1979). This list of rights is not
meant to be exhaustive. For a full discussion of which rights children have, see
generally THOMAS A. JACOBS, 1-3 CHILDREN AND THE LAW: RIGHTS & OBLIGATIONS
(1995); DONALD T. KRAMER, 1-3 LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN (2d ed. 1994). For an
international perspective on children's rights, see generally AMERICAN BAR ASS'N CTR.
ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW, CHILDREN's RIGHTS IN AMERICA: U.N. CONvENTION ON
THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD COMPARED WITH UNITED STATES LAW (Cynthia P. Cohen

& Howard A. Davidson eds., 1990).
72. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925).
73. Id.
74. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
75. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
76. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
77. Id.
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sought by unmarried minors.7" The Court held that the parental consent
provision was acceptable only if a complementary provision in the statute
allowed 79the minor to receive the consent of the court instead of her
parents.
In sum, while the Supreme Court has recognized that children have
some constitutional rights, 80 the Court has also recognized that children's
constitutional rights are not the same as adults and are sometimes
subordinate to those of their parents. 8' The reasons the Court has posited
for this constitutional difference are "the peculiar vulnerability of children;
their inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner;
and the importance of the parental role in child rearing."'
The states, however, retain the power under our federal system to
legislate for the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens.' And every
state has adopted procedures to protect children from abuse.' While the
Supreme Court is skeptical of the parenspatriaepower, it continues to reaffirm the power of the states to legislate for its citizens health, safety and
welfare." In examining child welfare laws, it is difficult to distinguish
between the ability of a state to legislate for its citizens' health, safety, and
welfare and what could be called the state's ability to act as parens
patniae.
Is the parens patriaepower now subsumed within the states' police
powers? After the Supreme Court's disavowal of parenspatriae, it would
seem that there would be fewer appeals to parens patriae as a source of
78. Id. at 642-44.
79. Id. at 650-51 (holding that the law in question was unconstitutional, in part
because it permitted "judicial authorization for an abortion to be withheld from a minor
who is found by the Superior Court to be mature and fully competent to make this
decision independently"). For the constitutionality of parental notification before an

abortion by a minor, see Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990)
and Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990).
80. See supra notes 57-77 and accompanying text.
81. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634-37 (1979); see also New Jersey v. TLO,

469 U.S. 325 (1985) (holding that the standard for searches of students in public school
is not probable cause, but the lower standard of reasonable suspicion).

82. Id. at 634.
83. This is often referred to as the states' police power. See, e.g., Keystone

Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); City of Newport, Ky. v.
Iacobucci, 479 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1986); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 932-33

(1975); California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 114 (1972).

84. See THOMAS A. JACOBS, 2-4 LEGAL DIRECTORY OF CHILDREN'S RIGHTS (1985)

[hereinafter DIRECTORY OF CHILDREN'S RIGHTS] (listing all state statutes dealing with
child welfare).
85. See, e.g., DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. at 473-74; Iacobucci, 479 U.S. at 95-96.
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authority. Such is not the case. For example, the New York state
constitution and statutes contain no explicit reference to the parenspatriae
power. Yet, the advisory notes and practice commentaries to sixty-one
New York statutory provisions contain some reference or explanation of
parens patriae.6 From 1967 (the year in which In re Gault cast doubt
on the parens patriaepower) to present the term parens patriae appears
in over 300 New York state cases.' All this suggests that state courts
are not necessarily skeptical of the parenspatriae power.
This appraisal of family law issues raises two areas of tension in the
law. The first is a conflict between the competing liberty interests of the
parent and the child; 88 the second is the conflict between judicial
recognition of children's constitutional rights and their procedural
9
incapacity to vindicate these rights based on common law and statute.
In other words, there is a question as to when or ifa child has a right; and
there is also a question of how a child can protect those rights in court.
The courts seem to apply one of two types of analysis to determine
when or if a child has a "right": (1) the state-as-parenspatriae analysis,
or (2) the constitutional rights analysis. Under either of these two
analytical frameworks a child has a "right" to be free from abuse and
neglect. Under a parens patriae analysis, this right flows from the
obligation that the state has imposed upon itself; that is, it has the duty to
Under the
protect the health, safety, and welfare of minors.'
interest.
a
liberty
as
right
this
has
child
constitutional rights analysis, a
v.
Santosky
in
right
this
recognized
have
to
seems
Court
Supreme
The
86. "Family court, in its role as parenspatriae, has the obligation to help protect
children from injury or mistreatment and to help safeguard their physical, mental, and

emotional well-being." N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1011 annot. (McKinney 1994) (Article
10-Child Protective Proceedings) (quoting Matter of Adrian J., 464 N.Y.S.2d 631 (Fam.
Ct. 1983)).
87. Westlaw search in the NY-CS database for cases using the term "parens
patriae" after 1967.
88. See id.
89. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 1201-02 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1996).
90. See Boland v. State of New York, No. 73398, 1996 WL 86321 (N.Y. App.
Div. Feb. 29, 1996) (holding that claimant parent could sue the state for negligence
where the abuse had been reported to the appropriate child welfare agency and the
agency failed to act within the state's required 24-hour period). CompareDeShaney v.
Winnebago County Dep't of Social Serv., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (holding that a state's
failure to protect a child against private violence generally does not constitute a violation
of the Due Process Clause because the Clause does not impose a duty on the state to

provide adequate protective services).

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

Kramer." Indeed, no matter what the scope of the child's liberty
in his or her own welfare, it would be illogical to consider it to
being forced to stay in a physically or emotionally abusive
situation. Thus, under either analytical framework, the right to
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interest
include
family
be free

from abuse exists for minors, and the question becomes how a minor can
vindicate this right. 2

II. RIGHTS CURRENTLY AFFORDED CHILDREN DESPITE
THEIR TRADITIONAL LEGAL DISABILITIES

Traditionally, in order to overcome the procedural handicaps of
infancy, a minor had to sue through a person who had reached the age of
majority.'
This adult is called the "next friend"' or "guardian ad
litem,"I and, although he or she speaks for the minor, the minor remains
the real party in interest."
Parents usually perform this function, and
in many states they can represent their children without any formal court
appointment.' In most cases, where the child's interest does not conflict
91. 455 U.S. 745, 754 n.7 (1982) (noting the "liberty interests of the child"); see
also Padgett v. Department of Health and Rehab. Serv., 577 So. 2d 565, 570 (Fla. 1991)
(recognizing the fundamental liberty interest of a child to be free from physical and
emotional violence).
92. The issue of the child protecting his or her right to be free from abuse at the
expense of the parent's liberty interest in parenting is addressed again infra part IV.
Logically, if a child is being abused by a parent, proof of abuse (by clear and convincing
evidence) should also be proof of parental unfitness. Cf. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 754 n.7
(noting that just because there may be liberty interests of the child at stake, does not
mean that the parents can be denied procedural due process).
93. See Kingsley v. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d 780, 783-84 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)
(discussing the traditional rationales for having a minor sue through a next friend or
guardian ad litem). See generally 43 C.J.S. Infants §§ 7, 199 (1978 & Supp. 1994).
94. See 43 C.J.S. Infants, supra note 93, § 199.
95. Id. While the terms "next friend" and "guardian ad litem" at one time had
different meanings, in most jurisdictions they mean the same thing. See 1 KRAMER,
supra note 71, at 530-33.
96. Id.; see Kingsley, 623 So. 2d at 784; see also FED. R. Civ. PRoc. 17(c):
Whenever an infant or incompetent person has a representative, such as a
general guardian, committee, conservator, or other like fiduciary the
representative may sue or defend on behalf of the infant. . . . If an infant.
* . does not have a duly appointed representative he may sue by his next friend
or guardian ad litem. The court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for an infant
...not otherwise represented in the action or shall make such other order as
it deems proper for the protection of the infant or incompetent person.
97. See generally KRAMER, supra note 71, at 532-46 (discussing the requirements
and appointment of guardians ad litem and compiling cases).
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does not conflict with that of his or her parents, a parent usually serves as
Yet, in domestic relations cases,
the next friend for the child.9
especially those dealing with the termination of parental rights, the
interests of child and parent diverge, and a parent cannot serve as a next

friend.'

As a result of this conflict of interest, the courts will usually

appoint a guardian ad litem who is not a family member't 0 The exact
responsibilities and duties of a guardian ad litem vary from state to
state."0 ' But generally speaking, the guardian ad litem must protect the
interest of the child, but that does not necessarily mean that the guardian

must present the child's wishes to the court.'

-

In many states,

however, if the guardian ad litem believes the child's interests are not
what the child wishes, the guardian ad litem must present to the court both
the wishes of the child and what the guardian ad litem considers to be in
the child's interest."
Even though the traditional view-that a minor must sue through a

next friend-is the rule in the vast majority of United States
jurisdictions,"

4

courts and legislatures have begun to whittle away at the

98. See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
65-66 (1973) (arguing that children require better representation in the courts)
[hereinafter BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS]; James K. Genden, Separate Legal

Representationfor Children:Protecting the Rights and Interests of Minors in Judicial
Proceedings, 11 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 565, 570-83 (1976) (arguing for individual
representation of children at any juvenile and at many family law proceedings); see also
Monroe L. Inker & Charlotte A. Perretta, A Child's Right to Counselin Custody Cases,
5 FAM. L.Q. 108, 113 (1971) (discussing child custody cases and the need for individual
representation of the child, at least where custody is contested); Note, Due Processfor
Children: A Right to Counsel in Custody Proceedings, 4 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 177 (1974).
99. See BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supranote 98, at 65-67; 1 KRAMER, supra

note 71, at 540-42; Genden, supra note 98.
100. See, e.g., N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 1201-02 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1996).
The guardian ad litem and attorney ad litem are not the same positions. The
guardian ad litem stands in place of the child, cures the child's legal disability to sue in
court, and seeks to ascertain what would be best for the child; the attorney ad litem
represents those wishes in court and in other legal matters. While the same person can
be both the guardian and the attorney, such is not always the case. See 1 KRAMER,
supra note 71, at 536-42.
101. 1 KRAMER, supra note 71, at 542-44 (noting this variety of duties).
102. See id.

103. See id.
104. For a directory of all state statutes dealing with Children's Rights, see 2-4
DIRECTORY OF CHILDREN'S RIGHTS, supra note 84.
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traditional disabilities of infancy. °5 Minors may be emancipated from
their legal disabilities in one of three fashions."° First, children may be
emancipated by operation of law-this includes statutes that define the age
of majority,1 7 statutes that make marriage or military service
emancipating,"' and statutes that allow for partial emancipation to
contract for certain things, such as necessaries or insurance. 9
Second, judicial recognition of particular unacceptable parent conduct
or of important rights of children can free the child to some extent from
the aegis of parental authority." 0 An example of this type of
emancipation is Bellotti v. Baird,"' where the courts became alternative

parents for minors seeking consent to abortions.1 2

In many

jurisdictions, the judiciary has limited the traditional immunity for

intrafamily torts."' Children can now sue their parents for certain torts
committed by the parents." 4 Part of the reason for providing parents
105. See THE LEGAL STATUS OF ADOLESCENTS, supra note 21, at 12-39.
106. Id.
107. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 60-70 (West 1982) (California Emancipation
Statute).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See THE LEGAL STATUS OF ADOLESCENTS, supra note 21, at 20-22.
111. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
112. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
113. See, e.g., Winn v. Gilroy, 681 P.2d 776 (Or. 1984); Gibson v. Gibson, 479
P.2d 648 (Cal. 1971); Goller v. White, 122 N.W.2d 193 (Wis. 1963) (the first state to
limit the traditional immunity for intrafamily torts).
Note, however, that the removal of immunity for intrafamily torts does not mean
that the minor suing the family member can sue in his or her own name. The minor
would still have to sue through a guardian ad litem. But allowing children to sue for
intrafamily torts in some instances was a recognition of the rights of children.
114. See Winn, 681 P.2d 776; Gibson, 479 P.2d 648; Goller, 122 N.W.2d 193.
A few states have been willing to completely abrogate parent-child immunity. See, e.g.,
Dzenutis v. Dzenutis, 512 A.2d 130 (Conn. 1986). But see Richards v. Richards, 599
So. 2d 135 (Dist. Ct. App. 1992), review dismissed by 604 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 1992)
(refusing to completely abrogate parent-child tort immunity and not allowing a child to
sue her parent for alleged sexual abuse). In the majority of states that still have
immunity in place, the general exceptions to the rule of family immunity are: (1) injuries
sustained as a result of the parent's negligence while driving; see Martin J. Rooney &
Colleen M. Rooney, ParentalTort Immunity: Spare the Liability and Spoil the Parent,
25 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1161 (1991); (2) suits in which the parent or child dies; see Davis
v. Smith, 253 F.2d 286 (3d Cir. 1958); Johnson v. Myers, 277 N.E.2d 778 (I11.App.
Ct. 1972); and, (3) where children are employed by their parents, see Felderhoff v.
Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 928 (Tex. 1971). Children cannot sue their parents for
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(and all immediate family members) immunity for intrafamily tort claims
was the threat to family harmony that such a case would pose.115 In
removing the immunity, courts found this rationale unpersuasive in light
of the fact that "'[a]n uncompensated tort is no more apt to promote or
preserve peace in the family than is an action between [family
members]."'16 Similarly, those opposed to allowing minors to sue for
the termination of parental rights on their own behalf because of the
disruption of family life it would bring are on shaky ground. Is it more
harmonious for the family to be allowed to continue to abuse or neglect
a child, or is it more harmonious for the family to allow the child to
extricate him or herself from the situation? The answer is the latter
because an abusive family situation is, a fortiori, not harmonious.
The third and final way for minors to become released from their
parents' control and to overcome their legal disabilities is by judicial
declaration of emancipation authorized by statute.11 7 Several states have
a legal process whereby a court can declare a minor emancipated." 8
The conditions required for such a judicial declaration differ from state to
state but typically require that it be in the best interest of the minor, that
the minor be able to manage her or his financial affairs and that she or he
lives apart from her or his parents." 9 Many of these states allow the
minor to directly petition the court for a declaration of emancipation.,'
Other areas of law have also recognized that eighteen as the age of
majority is too old. For example, in tax law a minor's earned income is
not the parent's income, but the minor's for tax purposes.' 2 ' Also, a
minor's unearned income is taxed at his or her parents' highest marginal
tax rate, but only until the age of fourteen." From fourteen to eighteen
inadequate parenting. See Burnette v. Wahl, 588 P.2d 1105 (Or. 1978).
115. See Gibson, 479 P.2d at 651-52 (discussing the rationales for immunity, but
finding them unsound).
116. See, e.g., id. at 651 (quoting Emery v. Emery, 289 P.2d 218, 224 (1955)).

117. See DALE, supra note 32, § 3.05.
118. See id; see, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.590 (1995); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 6069 (West 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46b-150-150e (West 1986); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 24-10-1, 28-6-2, 28-6-8 (Michie 1992).
119. See DALE, supra note 32, § 3.05[3].
120. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.590(a) (1995); CAL CIV. CODE § 64(a)
(West 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-150 (West 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-

6-8A (Michie 1992).
121. 26 U.S.C. § 73 (1994).
122. Id. § 1(g). This is commonly referred to as the "kiddie tax." See also Estate
of Butler v. United States, 798 F. Supp. 574 (E.D. Mo. 1992) (upholding against a due
process attack the taxation of the unearned income of a minor (under the age of 14) at
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years of age, a minor is not taxed at the parents' rate." Perhaps in no
other area of the law, however, has the dividing line between adult and
child been blurred than in the criminal law. Routinely, minors fourteen
years old are now tried as adults.' 24 If a minor, fourteen or older, is
suspected of committing one of host of violent crimes, this minor stands
a good chance of being tried as an adult.'"
Thus, in many areas of law, certain events "free" a minor from legal
disabilities; the question is why should not abuse or neglect also be such
an event? Bluntly stated, why is a minor treated as an adult when he or
she assaults someone, but is not considered an adult when that same minor
is assaulted, perhaps continually, by a family member?
III. TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS-CASE ANALYSIS
AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

At least one jurisdiction has allowed a child to petition directly for the
severance of parental rights.'" In Appeal in Pima County Juvenile
Severance Action No. S-113432,127 the court distinguished other legal
disabilities of infancy" from the legal disability which prohibits a child
from suing as the petitioner in a termination of parental rights case. 2 9
The court made no distinction between a child's capacity to be a party
when the petition is brought by someone else and when the child has
commenced it. 3 0
The basis for the Pima County No. S-113432 decision was an
interpretation of the Arizona parental rights termination statute' 3' and an
analysis of the foundations of the traditional legal disabilities of
the parents' highest marginal tax rate).
123. 26 U.S.C. § 1(g).
124. See Catherine R. Guttman, Note, Listen To The Children: The Decision To
Transfer Juveniles To Adult Court, 30 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 507, 520-28 (1995)
(describing the increase in trying minors as adults and discussing the various state
systems for transferring minors to adult court).
125. See id.
126. Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Severance Action No. S-113432, 872 P.2d
1240 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993).
127. Id.
128. For example, those disabilities with regard to marriage, driving automobiles,
military service, and consent to surgery. See id. at 1243.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-533(A) (1989).
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The Arizona statute provides that "[a]ny person or agency

that has a legitimate interest in the welfare of a child . . . may file a
Even
petition for the termination of the parent-child relationship. " I
though the statute mentioned both a petitioner and a child,' the court
did not find that this language precluded them from being the same
person." 5 A child could be considered a "person with a legitimate
interest" in his or her own welfare.3 6 With regard to traditional legal
disabilities, the court found that the reasons underlying them, such as age
limitation on marriage, driving a car, or service in the military, which
were based on the fact that these acts require a certain level of maturity
37
The same could not be said of a severance
and capacity.
38
proceeding.
Pima County No. S-113432 dealt with four children who lived with
their biological mother and her husband.13 Their biological father, to
whom the mother was never married, sought a custody and visitation
determination, and custody was awarded to the mother, with visitation
rights awarded to the father.Y After several violent situations with
4
The children sued for
their father, visitation became a problem.Y1
termination of the father's parental rights, and the court allowed them to
petition directly, even though their mother was available to petition for
termination (she subsequently joined the children's petition). 42
Another case involving a child's right to sue is that of Gregory
Kingsley, who sought to "divorce" his parents in Florida. 4 3 Kingsley
initially sued as petitioner; and the trial court allowed Kingsley to sue on
his own behalf, even though he was only eleven years old.'" The basis
for the trial court's decision was its interpretation of a statute similar to
132. Pima County No. S-113432, 872 P.2d at 1243.
133. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-533(A).
134. Id. § 8-534 (1986).
135. Pima County No. S-113432, 872 P.2d at 1243.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1242.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1242-43.
143. See Kingsley v. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d 780, 782 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
144. GregoryK. v. Ralph K., No. C192-5127, 1992 WL551488 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July
20, 1992), rev'd by Kingsley v. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d 780 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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that in Arizona. 45 The Florida statute required that "any person who
has knowledge of the facts alleged" may file a petition for the termination
of parental rights."4 The trial court found that Kingsley was a qualified
person under this statute.' 47
Furthermore, the court did not analyze a child's right to sue from the
perspective of traditional disabilities, but from the standpoint of
constitutional rights. 48 The trial court examined the Florida constitution
and the purposes of Florida's child welfare laws and found that under both
Gregory should be allowed to petition on his own behalf in seeking to
sever his natural parent's rights. 149 The court quoted with favor the
passage from Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,5 ' that "minors as well
as adults . . . possess constitutional rights."'
The Florida Court of Appeals reversed the trial court on this
issue.'
It held that the disability of infancy prevents a minor from
initiating or maintaining an action for the termination of parental
rights.'
The Kingsley court did not use the reasoning of the Pima
County No. S-113432 court, clinging to the traditional disabilities of
infancy and refusing to stray from them.'"
In addition, the Florida
court of appeals relied on a Florida Rule of Civil Procedure which states
that "an infant . . . who does not have a duly appointed representative
may sue by next friend or guardian ad litem ....
The court shall appoint
a guardian ad litem for an infant . . . not otherwise represented in an
action. ""'
Note that the language of this statute is not mandatory; it
uses the precatory
construction of "may sue" by next friend or guardian
56
ad litem.'
As a result of this precatory construction, the Florida appellate court
was compelled to discuss the reasons for the traditional rule, as well as the
issue of a child's constitutional rights.' 57 The court employed the
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. at *1.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.461 (West 1988).
GregoryK., 1992 WL 551488, at *1.
Id.
Id.
428 U.S. 52 (1976).
GregoryK., 1992 WL 551488, at *1 (quoting Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74).
See Kingsley, 623 So. 2d at 782-85.
Id.

154. Id.
155. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1.120(b) (West 1995).
156. Id.
157. See Kingsley, 623 So. 2d at 783.
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traditional rule because it provided for the "orderly administration of
justice and the procedural protection of a minor's welfare and interest by
the court."158 Kingsley reasoned that the fact that the child may be
represented by counsel is not enough. In order to ensure protection of the
child's interest, an adult party must stand in the place of the child before
the court, although the next friend or guardian ad litem does not become
a party to the suit." 9 On the issue of a child's constitutional rights, the
Kingsley court recognized that a child has constitutional rights, 11 but it
also noted that a state may legislate and restrict the exercise of those
rights, unless they unduly burden the minor's pursuit of a fundamental
right.'
The court couched the requirement of suit through a next
friend or guardian ad litem as merely a procedural requirement, rather
than a substantive one162 If a minor mistakenly brings an action in her
or his own name, such defect can be cured by the subsequent appointment
of a next friend or guardian ad litem.163
In an interesting coincidence, the same day that the Florida District
Court of Appeal reversed the lower court's ruling on Gregory Kingsley's
standing to sue, another lower court in Florida held that a minor had
standing to challenge a stipulation which would have set forth the parties'
rights, if enforced.)" In Twigg v. Mays, a Florida court had to decide
who were Kimberly May's parents in an unusual factual situation. "6 At
birth, Kimberly was apparently switched with another child, and she was
raised by Robert Mays, who was not her biological father."6 The
Twiggs sued to have Kimberly declared their child, but before the court
determined whether the Twiggs had standing to assert their parental
relationship, the parties entered into a stipulation agreeing to blood tests
to confirm parentage. 67 The parties also stipulated that the Twiggs
would not seek custody unless Robert Mays could be shown unfit and
agreed to develop a visitation schedule. 6 '
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See id. at 784-85, (citing Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643 n.23 (1979)).

162. Id. at 784.
163. Id.
164. Twigg v. Mays, No. 88-4489-CA-01, 1993 WL 330624 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug.

18, 1993).
165. Id. at *3-*4.
166. See id.
167. Id. at *1-*2.
168. See id.
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When the relationship between the parties broke down, however, the
Twiggs sued for custody, and Kimberly Mays counterclaimed, requesting
that any parental rights in the Twiggs be terminated.' 69 Relying on the
same Florida state constitutional language relied upon by the lower court
in the Kingsley case, 70 the court in Twigg determined that Kimberly had
standing in her own right and could challenge the previous stipulation,
seek to terminate the Twiggs' parental rights, and direct her own
attorney. 7' The court also noted that Kimberly's "legal" father, Robert
Mays, had joined the petition, and he unquestionably had standing.1
The court went on to hold that it was in Kimberly's best interest to stay
with Robert Mays and dismissed the Twiggs' petition. 73
In light of the unusual factual situation in Twigg, its strength as
precedent for the idea that children can sue on their own behalf is
questionable. With an appellate court deciding in the Kingsley case on the
same day that a minor must sue through a guardian ad litem, the timing
of the Twigg decision also casts doubt on its viability. Nonetheless, Twigg
stands, unreversed, and allowed a minor to sue for the termination of the
parental relationship.
As these cases demonstrate, the right to terminate parental rights is a
statutory right, but is informed by the common law notions of an infant's
legal disabilities. 74 Legislation in other states, which sets forth who
may file for the termination of parental rights, is open to interpretation
similar to that in Arizona.'"
For example, both Alabama and South
Carolina's statutes allow any interested party to petition for severance of
parental rights.'76 Michigan explicitly allows a child in foster care to
petition for termination of parental rights."7 No state court decision in
Michigan, however, has interpreted this statute to allow a minor to
petition directly. Other states have foreclosed the possibility of children
169. See id. at *3.
170. See Gregory K. v. Ralph K., No. C192-5127, 1992 WL 551488 (Fla Cir. Ct.
July 20, 1992).

171. See Twigg, 1993 WL 330624, at *3.
172. Id.
173. Id. at *4-*5.
174. See Kingsley, 623 So. 2d at 783-84. See generally 1 JACOBS, supra note

71, § 3:02.
175. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-18-5 (Michie 1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1564
(Law. Co-op. 1976).
176. ALA. CODE § 26-18-5 (Michie 1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1564 (Law. Coop. 1976).
177. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.19b(1) (West 1994) (MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 27.3178 (598.19b) (1995).
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petitioning by only allowing a state agency to petition for termination,"'
or by not
using the broad language of "any interested party" in their
179
statute.
Taken together, Pima County No. S-113432, Kingsley, and Twigg
highlight the issues behind a determination that a child has a right to sue
for termination of parental rights. Each opinion, however, failed to
explicitly state the policy issues behind their decisions."W In Pima
County No. S-113432, the court did not address the issue of very young
children.'' Should they be able to petition for termination? And what
age is too young? Does maturity really have nothing to do with the Pima
County No. S-113432 court's decision to allow a child to be a
petitioner?" If a child is a petitioner, does that mean that she or he can
independently direct her or his own counsel? At what age should that take
place? In Kingsley, the court concluded that the right to be one's own
petitioner is only a procedural right, rather than substantive one. Yet,
if a child has a liberty interest in her or his own safety and welfare, and
this is a fundamental right, what does it avail a child that she or he has
this substantive right but does not have a procedural right that will allow
the child to protect it?
A possible explanation exists, however, for the courts' avoidance of
these policy concerns. As Chief Justice John Marshall noted over 150
years ago, "[T]he duty of watching over their [minors'] interests devolves,
in a considerable degree, upon the court."' 84 Perhaps in the termination
cases discussed above, the courts (except for the appellate court in
Kingsley) tacitly recognized that the child's interests were adequately
protected, either by their attorney or by court oversight, and thus, the
need for the minor to sue through an adult was unnecessary.
In addition, to the ability of the court to protect the child's interest,
the decision to allow a minor to be a petitioner must be placed in the
societal context of the prevalence of child abuse and the systemic context
178. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.447(2) (Vernon 1978).
179. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-715(a) (West 1993); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 232.111(1) (West 1994); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2512(a) (1994).
180. See Kingsley v. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d 780, 783-84 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993);
Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Severance Action No. S-113432, 872 P.2d 1240, 124344 (Ariz. App. 1993).
181. See Pima County No. S-113432, 872 P.2d at 1243-44.

182. Robyn-Marie Lyon, Speakingfora Child: The Role of Independent Counselfor
Minors, 75 CAL. L. REV. 681 (1987) (arguing for a maturity inquiry of minors to

determine their capacity to sue).
183. See Kingsley, 623 So. 2d at 784.
184. Bank of the United States v. Ritchie, 11 U.S. (8 Pet.) 46, 50 (1834) (footnote

omitted).
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of an overburdened child welfare system. These final two factors weigh
heavily in favor of allowing a child to petition on her or his own behalf,
and are the subject of the next part.
IV. THE PROBLEM OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT AND THE
CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM'S ABILITY TO HANDLE THE PROBLEM
Though much publicized, 1' a recapitulation of the numerous
statistics of child abuse and maltreatment illustrates the extent of the
problem. Surveys by the Federal Department of Health and Human
Services indicate that the number of abused or neglected children has more
than doubled in the last decade, amounting to 2.9 million cases of child
abuse and neglect."8 The Statistical Abstract of the United States
reports that in 1990, 801,143 substantiated child victims of maltreatment
The number of substantiated claims of child
were reported. I 7
mistreatment rose in 1991 in the United States to 8 3 8 ,2 3 2 .11 In New
York State alone there were 51,168 cases of suspected child abuse and
maltreatment in 1985, of which 18,356 were substantiated. 81 9 Of the
substantiated cases, eighty-four percent of the perpetrators of child abuse
and maltreatment were the child's parents.19° While these statistics show
that child abuse is a wide-spread problem, they do not indicate how many
cases go unreported, which may be substantial, 191 nor do they
demonstrate the overall condition of children in society. According to the
Children's Defense Fund, children are now the largest group living below
185. See, e.g., Associated Press, Mistreatment of Kids Seems to be Getting
Deadlier, Group Says, Jan. 27, 1987, at 7A; Patricia Davis, Cases of Child Abuse
Growing More Severe, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 1988, at DI; For Other Vulnerable
Children, WASH. POST, May 15, 1993, at A24; Jack Kresnak, Increased Crack Abuse
Takes Toll On User's Children, DET. FREE PRESS, Feb. 23, 1987, at IA; Spencer Rich,

1.9 Million ChildAbuse, Neglect Cases Cited- 1985 Total Represents Steep Rise, WASH.
POST, Mar. 3, 1987, at A5; United Press International, Child Abuse Cases Rise, WASH.
POST, July 19, 1986, at B7.

186. Robert Pear, Many States Fail to Meet Mandates on Child Welfare, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 17, 1996, § 1, at 1.
187. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES

1993 at 209 (113th ed. 1994).
188. Id.
189. NEw YORK STATE COUNCIL ON CHILDREN & FAMILIES, STATE OF THE CHILD

IN NEW YORK STATE
190. Id. at 213.
191. Id. at 137.

140 (1988) [hereinafter STATE OF THE CHILD IN NEW YORK].
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the poverty line nationally, many in overburdened single-parent
families." 9 In New York State in 1985, approximately one in every
four children was living in poverty.193
To address this problem, all states have developed child welfare and
foster care programs' 94 designed to remove children from unhealthy or
dangerous living conditions.1g5 The system in most states follows a
similar pattern of state involvement in families where child abuse or
maltreatment is suspected. 96 All state systems became more uniform
after the entry of the federal government into this arena with the Adoption
Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980. "9 The Child Welfare Act
sets out several guidelines which the states must follow in order to receive
federal funds. 198 The guidelines include providing services to parents
prior to the removal of a child from a home in order to attempt to make
the home safe,' 91 providing reunification services to parents where the
family maintenance services have been unsuccessful,m and ensuring that
a permanent plan is established for a child in foster care within eighteen
months of the child's entering into care.20 '
While federal law now sets certain guidelines for the states to follow,
the overwhelming majority of dependency proceedings are held in state
courts.'
The usual process by which a child is removed from an
abusive home environment is as follows.' °3 Any and all professionals
who come or are likely to come into contact with children must report
suspected child abuse and neglect to the appropriate state agency.20
After a report the state child welfare agency conducts an investigation to
192.

CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND,

THE STATE

OF AMERICA'S CHILDREN

26-35

(1991).
193. See STATE OF THE CHILD INNEW YORK, supra note 158, at 69.
194. See DALE, supra note 32, § 4.01; see also 2-4 DIRECTORY OF CHILDREN'S
RIGHTS, supra note 84 (listing the child welfare laws for the fifty states).
195. See DALE, supra note 32, § 4.01.

196. Id.
197. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94
Stat. 516 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-28 & 670-87 (1994)).
198. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 625, 675 (1994).
199. Id. § 625(a)(1)(C).
200. Id. § 625(a)(1)(D).
201. Id. § 675(5)(C).
202. See DALE, supra note 32, § 4.01[1].
203. See DALE, supra note 32, §§ 4.01-4.14 (describing the procedures whereby a
child is removed from threatening family situations, culminating in the termination of

parental rights); 3 KRAMER, supra note 71, at 3-43 (same).
204. See, e.g., N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 413 (McKinney Supp. 1995).
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determine if the report was warranted.' 5 At this point the state social
worker is under a heavy burden to make the "right" decision, but typically
a statute requires the state agency to do all things necessary to avoid
removal.'
If removal is necessary then placement is first attempted
with a relative,' and if that option is unavailable, then the child is
placed in foster care. 8
Within a certain time period after removal,' the family court must
hold a hearing to determine if probable cause exists to believe that the
child is in need of help.21 The consequence of this hearing is an order
of placement which will call for continued foster care placement or a
return to the family home.2 '
The agency then continues its
investigation to determine whether there is appropriate evidence for the
agency to petition to have the child declared, depending on the vocabulary
of the state, a minor in need (MIN), a person in need of services (PINS)
or a child in need of services (CHINS).2 2 If filed, a hearing is held on
this petition, and the court in this situation usually has broad powers to try
to remedy the problem,1 3 which can result in continued placement of
the child in foster care, and some form of treatment for the parents, the
child, or both. 1 4
As mandated by federal law, the court must review this determination
every six months.2 ' If the state agency determines that the child's
situation is not going to improve, then it can petition for termination of
parental rights,216 which will allow the child to be adopted. Provided
205. See DALE, supra note 32, §§ 4.09-4.14.
206. See, e.g., N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 384-b.l.(a)(ii) & 7.(t) (McKinney 1992).

207. See, e.g., id. §§ 384-b (delineating requirements for removal to foster care).
208. See, e.g., id. §§ 383-c, 385 (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1996); N.Y. FAM. CT.
ACT § 1055 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1996).
209. See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 729 (McKinney 1983) (72 hours).
e.g., N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW §§ 383-c, 385; N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1055.
211. See N.Y FAM. CT. ACT § 739 (McKinney 1983).
210. See,

212. See id. §§ 711-83 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1996) (setting forth procedure
whereby child is declared a PINS).
213. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361 (West Supp. 1991) (stating that
if court asserts jurisdiction over child, court may interfere in parent-child relationship to
any degree it finds appropriate).
214. See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 751, 771, 775, 1061-69, 1071 (McKinney
1983 & Supp. 1996).
215. 42 U.S.C. § 628(a)(1) (1994).
216. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.447(2) (Vernon 1978).
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that the state statute allows it, the petition for termination could be filed
by "any interested party," as discussed above.217
While these child welfare systems are in place to aid children and
remove them from threatening situations, they often are ineffective in
achieving this goal. Three problems areas with the current system will be
examined seriatim: first, the competing interests between parent and child
and how the courts deal with them; second, limited and overburdened state
child welfare resources, which lead to long delays and failures to act; and
third, inadequate representation for children in termination proceedings.
The first problem was introduced earlier in this Note: how can the law
accommodate parents' traditional rights to custody and care of their
children, while at the same time protect the liberty interests of
children?2" 8 The trend is toward a greater recognition of what will be
in the "best interests of the child" rather than a more parent-focused
analysis.2 19 Just what are the "best interests of the child" is nebulous
and has been interpreted without much consistency by the courts.' ° In
one California case even the fact that the father had murdered his
children's mother was not enough to satisfy a statutory requirement for
termination of the father's parental rights based on a best interests
analysis.2 1
Some states have an explicit statutory mandate that judicial
proceedings dealing with children must consider the child's best
interests.m Only a few statutes provide that the child's best interests
are the sole consideration in termination decisions.'
The statutes which
217. See supra notes 174-79 and accompanying text.
218. See Michael Dale, Children Before The Supreme Court: In Whose Best
Interest?, 53 ALB. L. REv. 513 (1989) (giving a detailed analysis of the Supreme Court
cases dealing with children's rights and the resulting tension with parental liberty
interests in child-rearing).
219. See Christian R. Van Deusen, The Best Interesisof the Child and The Law, 18
PEPP. L. REv. 417 (1991) (reviewing and criticizing recent statutes and cases, especially
those from California, dealing with the best interests of the child).
220. Id.; see also Gloria Christopherson, Minnesota Adopts a Best Interests
Standard in ParentalRights Termination Proceedings:In Re J.J.B., 71 MINN. L. REv.

1263 (1987); Michael Fine, Where Have All the Children Gone? Due Process and
Judicial Criteriafor Removing Children From Their Parents' Homes in California, 21
Sw. U. L. REv. 125 (1992).
221. In re James M., 135 Cal. Rptr. 222 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
222. See GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-8(a) (West Supp. 1986); IDAHO CODE § 162005(e) (1979); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4055 (Supp. 1986); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 48.426(3) (1986).
223. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.180(c)(2) (1983); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16304(e) (1981); IDAHO CODE § 16-2005(e) (1979).
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seem to require only examination of the child's best interests, however,

cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny, unless there is a showing of
parental unfitness."
Some states, without the statutory mandate to
analyze the child's best interest in a termination proceeding, have
incorporated this test by judicial decree.'

Other states only allow an

inquiry into the child's best interest after a showing of parental
unfitness.'
Even though the state must prove parental unfitness in a
termination proceeding, such a showing seems to flow logically from a
proof of abuse. Thus, what appears to be a two-tiered analysis (of first
proving parents unfit and second determining the best interests of the
child) collapses into one tier of analysis: did or has the parent abused or

neglected the child? '

Answering this question demonstrates whether

or not parents are unfit, and often can determine what is in the best
interest of the child, that is, whether or not the child should be removed

from the family.
Further complicating the issue, however, is the congressional mandate
that state agencies should try to prevent the breakup of the family. 8
This mandate is evident in state statutes requiring removal only where

necessary, after many efforts are made to reconcile the family.

9

This

requirement has been criticized because it allows abused children to
224. See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (holding that due process
rights of parents may be infringed if state were to terminate without a finding that
parent's are unfit); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862-63
(1977) (requiring a showing of unfitness before the state may break up a natural family
if that family objects); In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1377 (Utah 1982) (basing a termination
of parental rights solely on the child's best interest violates U.S. and state constitutions).
225. In re J.J.B., 390 N.W.2d 274, 276 (Minn. 1986); see also Finlay v. Finlay
148 N.E. 624 (N.Y. 1925); Wilson v. Mitchell, I1I P. 21, 25 (Colo. 1910).
226. In re Clausen, 508 N.W.2d 649 (Mich. 1993) (holding that a child has a
constitutionally protected interest in family life, but that the child's interest is not
independent of the parents' interest without a showing of parental unfitness); In re
Moseley, 660 P.2d 315 (Wash. 1983) (holding that the trial court erred in failing to
examine fitness of parents).
227. The specific parental behavior that can support a termination of parental rights
case varies somewhat from state to state. See 3 KRAMER, supra note 71, at 3-43.
Generally there are four types of behavior that give rise to a termination proceeding:
abuse, neglect, endangerment, or abandonment. Id..
228. See supra notes 195-200 and accompanying text.
229. See, e.g., N.Y. SOC. SEPV. LAW § 384-b.1. & 7. (McKinney 1988).

19961

NOTE: TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RELATIONSHIP

remain in dangerous or unhealthy situations when they should have been
removed.230

Using every effort to maintain the family unit is often unworkable
because the child welfare system is ill-equipped to fulfill this goal as it is
suffering under a tremendous caseload."
Recent newspaper articles
have reported the problem, many saying that the system is

overwhelmed.

22

Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich has even

suggested a return to an orphanage system because the foster care system

is failing.

3

With the system overburdened, children are failing to

receive the attention they need and are required to have by statute?

For example, in the Kingsley case,

5

4

the court-appointed guardian for

Gregory, who was supposed to help him resolve his case after eighteen

months in foster care, never spoke to him during the entire thirty months
the boy was in the system.

6

230. See David J. Herring, Inclusion of the Reasonable Efforts Requirement in
Termination of ParentalRights Statutes: Punishingthe Childfor the Failuresof the State
Child Welfare System, 54 U. PiTt. L. REV. 139, 139 (1992) (criticizing the family
reunification requirements because they keep children in difficult and dangerous
situations); see also Alice C. Shotton, Making Reasonable Efforts in Child Abuse and
Neglect Cases: Ten Years Later, 26 CAL. W. L. REv. 223 (1990); Georgia Kovanis,
Man Chargedin Death Had Been Accused 7 Times of Abuse, DET. FREE PRESS, Apr.
11, 1988, at 3A.

231. See Herring, supra note 230, at 179-90.
232. See, e.g., Jim Brady, GrandJury Hits Backlog of ChildAbuse Reports, WASH.
POST, Mar. 6, 1984, at B3; Georgia Kovanis, Fatal Assumptions - The Failure of

Michigan's Child ProtectionSystem: Children Die Despite Early Signs of Abuse, DEa.
FREE PRESS, Nov. 19, 1989, at 1B; Jack Kresnak, Numbers Raise FearsDSS is Missing
More Kids in Danger, DET. FREE PRESS, Apr. 17, 1994, at 1F; Nancy Lewis, Child
Neglect Cases Break Daily Record In D.C. Court - Reflects a System Overwhelmed,
WASH. POST, May 10, 1994, at Al; Maryland Child Services Called Understaffed,
WASH. POST, Oct. 11, 1987, at B3.

233. See Celia W. Dugger, Teen-Agers in the OrphanageStorm Have Lost Families
but Found Voices, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1995, § 1, at 40; see also Milt Fruedenheim,

CharitiesAiding Poor FearLoss of Government Subsidies, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1996,
at B8; Edward Walsh, As At Risk Children Overwhelm Foster Care, Illinois Considers
Orphanages, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 1994, at A9. Gingrich's suggestion has been
countered with a great deal of criticism. See, e.g., Robert Pear, White House Says
Young Will Suffer Under G.O.P. Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1994, at Al; Richard
Wexler, A Warehouse is Not a Home, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1995, § 1, at23 (editorial).

234. See Pear, supra note 186, at 1.
235. Kingsley v. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d 780 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
236. Lynn Smith, Giving Kids a Say on TheirLegal Rights, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 5,
1992, at 7D.
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Many states are also failing to meet the legal mandates of their child
welfare programs. 7 As many as twenty-one states' child welfare
programs are under court supervision because they are not fulfilling their
legal obligations. 8 Child social workers often handle fifty to seventy
cases each; whereas the Child Welfare League of America suggests no
more than fifteen cases per social worker is inappropriate.?29 In
response to this crisis, New York has appointed a Commission on Child
Abuse and Neglect to review the problem. 210 An interim report of the
Commission recommended several changes to New York law, including:
(1) elevating some misdemeanors involving the endangering of child
welfare to felonies; (2) easing the requirements for terminating parental
rights in cases of sexual abuse; and (3) that a positive drug test be enough
to prove a pregnant mother's neglect. 241
Aside from child welfare workers providing inadequate services to
children, proper attorney representation is a problem in termination
proceedings too. Although the constitution does not require that an
attorney be provided to a parent in termination proceedings, 24 2 most
states recognize a right to counsel for a child who is the subject of a
dependency proceeding.243
The requirement of representation of
children is also buttressed by the fact that in order to receive funds under
the federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, a state must
237. Pear, supra note 186, at 1.
238. Id.
239. Id.

240. See Gary Spencer, NewLaw on ChildrenProposed,N.Y. L.J., Mar. 20, 1996,
at 1.
241. See id. at 1, 4; see also David Firestone, GiulianiSeeks Tough Laws To Help
Abused Children, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 2, 1996, at B6 (discussing Mayor Rudolph
Guiliani's proposals to improve child welfare agencies in New York City).
242. Lassiter v. Department of Social Serv., 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
243. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 317(c) (West 1994) (stating that if a
child is the alleged victim of abuse, an attorney must be appointed to represent the child
in all judicial proceedings); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, para. 802-17(3) (West 1994)
(allowing a court to appoint a guardian whenever it finds that there may be a conflict of
interest between the minor and his parents); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 119, § 29
(West 1994) (stating that a child has a right to counsel at all dependency hearings); N.Y.
FAM. CT. ACT § 249 (West 1994) (requiring that a legal guardian be appointed in all

child protective proceedings); see also William W. Patton, It Matters Not What Is, But
What Might Have Been: The StandardofAppellate Review for Denialof Counselin Child
Dependency and ParentalSeverance Trials, 12 WHITTIER L. REV. 537 (1991); Donald
Duquette & Susan Ramsey, Representation of Children and Child Abuse and Neglect
Cases:An EmpiricalLook at What Constitutes Effective Representation, 20 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 341 (1987).
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appoint an attorney ad litem (who can be the guardian ad litem as well)
for a child in a dependency proceeding.244
Even with an attorney, adequate representation of the child's interest
remains a problem.24 One commentator has argued that an attorney
"speaking" for the child merely interjected a usually, white, middle-class
viewpoint into the proceedings.24 Decisions by the guardian ad litem
also have a tendency to tip the balance toward one side or the other in
proceedings, which places the attorney in a powerful position to decide the
case.247 In order to remedy this problem, another commentator has
suggested that children seven years and older should have the right to
Another has called for a
direct their own proceedings in court.2 '
modification of the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility to allow
for a "maturity inquiry" to determine if the minor is capable of directing
the client.249
After examining these three problems-parent's rights versus a child's
best interests, the failures and inadequacies of the child welfare system,
and the ability of a child to have a voice through counsel in judicial
proceedings-the question is whether allowing a minor to petition on his
or her own behalf will help ameliorate these problems. With regard to the
first problem, allowing a child to petition should not effect the due process
standard which a court applies to termination of parental rights
proceeding." s Merely allowing a child to be a petitioner does not
require the court to focus only on the best interests of the child to the
exclusion of an examination of the fitness of the parents."5 Allowing
a child to be his or her own petitioner also should help provide a remedy
to a child entwined in an overburdened child welfare system. If the child
244. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-18e, 5110 (1994).
245. Martin Guggenheim, The Right to RepresentedBut Not Heard:Reflections on
Legal Representation for Children, 59 N.Y.U. L. RaV. 76 (1984). See generally
Jonathan 0. Hafen, Children'sRights and Legal Representation-The ProperRoles of
Children, Parents and Attorneys, 7 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHIcs & PUB. POL'Y 423

(1993); Tara L. Muhlhauser, From 'Best' to 'Better'-The Interests of Childrenand the

Role of a GuardianAd Litem, 66 N.D. L. REv. 633 (1990); Comment, Appointing

Counselfor the Child in Actions to Terminate ParentalRights, 70 CAL. L. REv. 481

(1982).

246.
247.
248.
249.

See Guggenheim, supra note 245, at 125-29.
Id.
Id.
See Lyon, supra note 182, at 681-94 (defining maturity inquiry).

250. See id. (discussing the need for the child's voice to be heard at a dependency
or severance proceeding and arguing for a maturity inquiry to determine if the child can

direct counsel).

251. See id.; see also supra notes 53-82 and accompanying text.
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welfare agency is overwhelmed and understaffed and it is the only party
that can petition for the termination of parental rights, then permitting a
minor to petition may provide an expedited remedy to an extended
confinement in the foster care system.
The question of adequate representation of a minor, ensuring that his
or her voice is heard in court, is more problematic. Eventually, the
question becomes at what age can a child direct his or her attorney."
Although science supports the proposition that a child seven years old can
reason concretely, and thus may be able to provide adequate guidance to
their counsel, 53 given the variety of environments in which children are
raised a case-by-case analysis of whether a child if of sufficient maturity
This is the position taken in the
and understanding is appropriate.'
United Kingdom.
V.

THE CHILDREN

ACT

OF

1989

IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

An international example of comprehensive legislation with respect to
children's welfare is the United Kingdom's Children Act of 1989
(Children Act). 55 Drawing on previous case law, 6 the Children Act
puts the welfare of the child as its paramount consideration. 57 In order
to ensure that the welfare of the child is the paramount consideration,
section one of the Children Act requires that delays be avoided 8 and
that courts first consider "the ascertainable wishes and feelings of the child
concerned."259 Before the Children Act, case law in England had
recognized that the hard and fast rule of legal disabilities for those below
the age of majority was inappropriate, given the traditional power of the
252. See Guggenheim, supra note 245, at 125-29 (arguing that children seven years
old and above can direct counsel).
253. See GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, How OLD IS OLD
ENOUGH? THE AGES OF RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 19-38 (1989).

254. See Lyon, supra note 182, at 689-95.
255. The Children Act 1989 (Eng.). See generally R. WHITE, P. CARR, ET AL.,
A GUIDE TO THE CHILDREN ACT 1989 v-vii, 33-38 (1990) (discussing the changes the
Children Act implemented and analyzing the specific language of the statute); L.
FELDMAN & B. MITCHELS, CHILDREN ACT 1989-A PRACTICAL GUIDE 16-23 (1990)
(same).
256. Hewer v. Bryant, [1970] 1 Q.B. 357, 369; Gillick v. West Norfolk and
Wisbech Area Health Authority, [1986] AC 112 (H.L.).
257. See Children Act, § 1(1).
258. Id.§ (1)(2).
259. Id.§ (1)(3)(a).
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In Hewer v.
state to act as guardian under its parens patriae power.'
Bryant,261 Lord Denning set out the idea of a continuum of parental
authority:
The common law can, and should, keep pace with the times. It
should declare ... that the legal right of a parent to the custody
of a child ends at the eighteenth birthday; and even up till then,
it is a dwindling right which the courts will hesitate to enforce
against the wishes of the child, the older he is. It starts with a
right of control and ends with little more than advise. 2
This standard was confirmed in the case of Gillick v. West Norfolk and
Wisbech Area Health Authority,'63 which involved a challenge to a
memorandum of the English Department of Health and Social
The memorandum allowed doctors to prescribe
Services.'
contraceptives to children under the age of sixteen without parental
The court upheld the memorandum against the mother's
consent.'
contention that, as parent, she bad the right to custody and control of her
The Gillick rule is "that
children with regard to contraception.'
parental right yields to the child's right to make his own decisions when
he reaches a sufficient understanding and intelligence to be capable of
making up his own mind on the matter requiring decision."' 7 The
Gillick rule was included in the Children Act by allowing a minor child
to petition the court directly with regard to matters of his or her
This provision is not an absolute right of the minor, but can
welfare.'
be obtained with the leave of the court if the child is of sufficient age and
understanding. 6 9
One English commentator has noted that the Children Act does not
couch access to the courts in terms of rights; instead it focuses on needs
260. Hewer, [1970] 1 Q.B. at 369; Gillick, [1986] AC 112 (I.L.)

261. [1970] 1 Q.B. 357.
262. Hewer, 1 Q.B. at 369.

263. [1986] AC 112 (H.L.)
264. Gillick, [1986] AC at 113.

265. Id.
266. Id. at 186.
267. Id.. See generally H.K. BEvAN, CHILD LAw 3-19 (1989) (discussing general
principles in the law of the United Kingdom relating to children before the Children

Act).
268. See Children Act, § 10(2)(b).
269. Id.
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of children."
This avoids the problem of logic in American law that
surrounds the issue of granting fundamental rights while not allowing
procedural rights to vindicate them.?'1
Even though the United Kingdom may have more of a focus on the
state as parens patriae than the United States, which is more concerned
with protecting rights, the Children Act provides a good example of
flexibility in attempting to promote child welfare. Instead of set rules
about when children can enter court, the Children Act allows children of
'sufficient age and understanding' to try and change their position for the
better. The United States should follow the United Kingdom's example
with regard to petitioning for termination of parental rights.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Note argues that a minor, provided he or she has sufficient age
and understanding, should be able to petition on his or her own behalf for
the termination of parental rights. Instead of determining who can serve
as the minor's guardian ad litem, the courts should first determine whether
the minor has sufficient age and understanding to direct his or her own
counsel. Critics may contend that allowing children into court causes a
host of problems: that children will try to "divorce" their parents for not
increasing their allowance, and that foster parents will seduce a foster
child into petitioning for termination. These concerns are valid, but they
are in large part mitigated by the already existing ability of the courts to
protect a child's interest. Also, having a guardian ad litem does not
necessarily mean that the child's wishes are effectively presented to the
court. At least for more mature minors, direct input of the child's
interest, not filtered through the adult guardian ad litem's views, may
allow the court to come to a better decision on what will be best for the
child.
Several other areas of law and social policy also support the right of
minors of sufficient age and understanding to sue directly for termination:
first, courts have recognized a child's constitutionally protected liberty
interest in his or her own welfare and the state's have imposed upon
themselves statutory duties to protect children; second, judges may
analogize to other areas of the law where a minor's traditional legal
disabilities have been, partially or entirely, removed; third, in state
statutes that allow "any interested person" to petition for termination of
270. THEODORE J. STEIN, CHILD WELFARE AND THE LAW 65-75 (1991).
271. See Donald N. Duquette, Child Protection Legal Process: Comparing The
United States and Great Britain, 54 U. PrTT. L. REV. 239 (1992) (comparing many of

the provisions of the Children Act to those in American jurisdictions and discussing the
differences in perspective in respect of children's rights between the two countries).
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parental rights; fourth, in the inability of an overwhelmed child welfare
to deal with the tremendous problem of child abuse; and fifth, in the
example of the United Kingdom's recent revision to its law to allow
children to petition directly. These factors weigh in favor of granting
minors the right to petition even in the face of parents' constitutionally
protected right to custody and control of their children and the problem of
adequate representation of children if they are allowed to be petitioners.
Returning to the image presented by the sculpture described in the
introduction, Justice must not only reach down toward the child, the child
must be allowed to reach up toward the scales of justice in order to avoid
being bitten by the snake.
Jay C. Laubscher

